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The dual purposes of the United States Bankruptcy Code are the
financial rehabilitation of debtors and the satisfaction, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, of creditors' claims. The policy evinced by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is the encouragement
and protection of accumulated savings for retirement years. Interesting
crosscurrents attend the meeting of the policies behind these two statu-
tory schemes. Pension assets of a debtor in bankruptcy are not given the
protections contemplated by ERISA if they are attached by creditors.
Conversely, maximum saisfaction of creditors' claims is not achieved if
the debtors' pension assets are not subject to attachment In resolving
the conflict between ERISA and Bankruptcy Code policies, courts have
typically favored the Code Professor Wohl examines this conflict and
concludes that ERISA and Bankruptcy Code principles can be judicially
and legislatively harmonized without violating the purposes of either.
The harmony results from recognition that ERISA pension arrange-
ments have a two-part nature: they are both retirement schemes and tax
t Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.S.
1969, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1972, University of California at Davis.
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deferred savings accounts According to Professor Woh, that part of an
ERISA arrangement representing a retirement scheme should be ex-
empt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate, and that part of the arrange-
ment representing the tax deferred savings should become property of
the estate This resolution leaves intact both ERISA's assurance of am-
ple retirement funds and the Bankruptcy Code's promise of maximum
repayment of creditors consistent with a debtor's 'fresh start."
I. INTRODUCTION
An individual seeking protection under the bankruptcy laws' generally is
attempting to obtain either relief from debts or a court supervised plan to pay
existing debts in an orderly fashion.2 A debtor seeking immediate liquidation of
debts will proceed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that
the debtor's existing assets be turned over to creditors in payment of as much of
the debtor's liabilities as such assets can liquidate. In turn the debtor is relieved
of any further liability to pay remaining prebankruptey debts.3 A debtor seeking
a court supervised plan for the payment of some or all debts will pursue the
protection granted under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, both of which anticipate payment of existing debts in accordance with a
schedule reasonably matching the debtor's actual cash flow.
4
1. The federal bankruptcy laws have gone through a series of incarnations. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, was substantially revised by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 840, and then repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979). The 1978 Act was amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. Following common usage, this
Article will refer to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Chandler Act of 1938 as the Bankruptcy
Act and to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 as the Bankruptcy Code.
2. For a review of the reasons individuals declare bankruptcy, see D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971). Although recognizing that bad debt manage-
ment is an important factor in many personal bankruptcies, these authors suggest that a significant
portion of personal bankruptcies is caused by forces beyond the control of the debtor.
A report by the United States Comptroller General prepared for the House of Representatives
in 1983 indicated that the reasons for declaring bankruptcy in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 pro.
ceedings were increases in cost of living (67% of Chapter 7 respondents and 72% of Chapter 13
respondents), unemployment (36% of Chapter 7 respondents and 34% of Chapter 13 respondents),
and unusual medical bills (36% of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 respondents). COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK 15-16 (July 20, 1983).
In another study, four reasons were most frequently cited as the causes of bankruptcy: medical
bills (43%), too much credit purchasing (44%), rises in the cost of living (45%), and creditor collec-
tion attempts (29%). Two other reasons, cited by 28% of the respondents to this study, were marital
problems and easy access to credit. A. SULLIVAN, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY, PERSONAL
BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES, COSTS AND BENEFITS, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER 35 (Krannert Gradu-
ate School of Management, Purdue University Monograph No. 24, 1982).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982). The debtor must cooperate with the trustee in liquidating
property of the estate. Id. § 521. See also R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, 1-9 to
1-24 (1984) (overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
4. For an excellent general review of Chapter 13 procedures, see W. DRAiE & J. MORRIS,
CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE (1984).
Neither Chapter 11 reorganizations nor Chapter 13 proceedings will be discussed in this Arti-
cle. The theoretical and policy considerations underlying these bankruptcy alternatives are substan-
tially different from those underlying Chapter 7. As a practical matter the issues raised in this
Article are not serious problems under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 circumstances because
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This Article will address the question whether pension assets5 vested in a
debtor who is not currently receiving benefit payments under the pension are
property that must be turned over to creditors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. De-
termining whether a debtor's pension assets are available to creditors in a bank-
ruptcy requires more than a straightforward analysis of the federal bankruptcy
statute and its case law amplification. The apparently conflicting policies of the
federal bankruptcy laws and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) 6 must also be examined. Conflicts arise because ERISA policy
encourages the accumulation of savings for retirement and the protection of ac-
cumulated retirement benefits, 7 whereas the bankruptcy laws are motivated by
the dual purposes of allowing the debtor a new financial beginning and permit-
ting creditors to recoup from the debtor's existing assets as much of the monies
owed them as is possible.8 The sanctity and protection of retirement benefits
cannot be maintained if those benefits can be attached by creditors. Conversely,
the maximum amount of a debtor's assets is not made available to creditors if a
substantial portion of those assets is in a retirement account that is unavailable
to creditors.9 Analyzing the issues raised by this conflict, this Article reviews
the distinction between exemptions' 0 and exclusions" as they affect pension
benefits in a bankruptcy estate. The Article further discusses whether the pen-
sion laws tolerate creditor access to pension benefits in a Chapter 7 proceeding,
and if they do tolerate such access, whether the laws impose different treatment
of those benefits based upon their being subject to exemption or exclusion.
12
Finally, the Article, accepting that at least some pension benefits should be avail-
able to creditors, proposes an analytical method that: (1) determines how much
of a debtor's pension benefits should be protected from creditors, (2) produces
neither chapter requires liquidation of the debtor's assets as does Chapter 7. Rather, Chapters 11
and 13 are concerned with debt payments made from a debtor's cash flow.
5. As used in this Article, the terms "pension" and "pension arrangement" include retirement
benefits accrued under corporate and self-employed pension and profit-sharing plans, individual re-
tirement accounts and annuities, and any other deferred compensation plan for which tax deferral on
contributions is permitted under I.R.C. §§ 401, 501 (1985).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 is the "short title" (presumably so defined by Congress with tongue firmly in cheek) of the
Pension Reform Act of 1974. This Act substantially revised the Internal Revenue Code, added
§§ 1001-1461 to Title 29 of the United States Code, and deleted the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1975, and previously
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309). Throughout this Article the Pension Reform Act of 1974, as
amended from time to time, shall be referred to as ERISA.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 143-53. The most important purpose of ERISA is to
ensure that benefits earned by a participant are protected from appropriation by a plan's sponsor, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1112 (1985); I.R.C. § 4975 (1985), and from the sponsor's imprudent investment of
the plan's assets. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-04 (1985); I.R.C. § 4975 (1985).
8. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) ("It is the twofold purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and
then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left
untouched.").
9. The most substantial asset of some debtors is their vested interest in a pension plan. Pen-
sion benefits represent highly liquid assets that are actively sought by creditors even when debtors
have other substantial assets.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
11. Id. §541.
12. See infra notes 72-105 & 120-139 and accompanying text.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the same result whether exemption or exclusion theory is used, and (3) allows
adherence to the purposes of both pension and bankruptcy laws.
13
H. BANKRuPTcY LAW-A BRiEF REviEw
A. Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as from time to time amended, 14 governed
bankruptcy matters prior to October 1, 1979.15 One of its significant purposes
was to "protect debtors and their families from pauperism and to facilitate
[their] rehabilitation." 16 One approach adopted under the statutory framework
to accomplish this goal was to exempt certain property of a debtor from attach-
ment by creditors17 even though such property was property of the debtor's
estate.' 8 Another approach was to exclude from the debtor's estate altogether
property whose title was deemed too tenuous or the need for which too over-
whelming to subject it to creditors' claims.19 Consequently, the question of
what constituted property available to a debtor's creditors became a primary
focus of many bankruptcy proceedings.
20
Questions of what property in the debtor's estate should be exempt were
easily resolved by statutory specification. 21 The definition of what became prop-
erty of a debtor's bankruptcy estate, however, was not based on a specific list of
13. See infra notes 162-72 (Section VI).
14. See supra note 1.
15. October 1, 1979, was the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See supra
note 1.
16. Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commiion of the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and
Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975).
17. Formerly debtors were allowed only those exemptions permitted by the debtor's state of
domicile. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 24, 30 Stat. 544, 553, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682; Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 69, 52 Stat.
840, 879 (later codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The current bankruptcy laws provide a federal exemption scheme, 11
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982), but continue to allow a debtor to elect his or her domiciliary state's exemp-
tions in lieu of those specified under the federal statute. Id. § 522(b)(1).
18. Property of the bankruptcy estate is property in which the debtor has an interest at the time
a bankruptcy petition is filed and which, subject to exemptions, may be applied toward satisfaction of
prebankruptcy debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); infra note 49. There is at least a theoretical
distinction between exemptions and exclusions. If property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate it
is outside the ambit of control of the bankruptcy laws. If property is included in the estate but is
exempt from creditor attachment, it is under the control of the bankruptcy laws but is not available
for satisfaction of prebankruptcy debts. The bankruptcy laws prior to October 1, 1979, were highly
dependent upon the exclusion concept, whereas the laws after that date are more exemption ori-
ented. For an example of the impact of this distinction, see Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally),
506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed infra note 37.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 544, 565, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
20. See, eg., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974); Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970);
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966); Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker), 473 F. Supp.
746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 918
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94, 96-97 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978).
21. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 24, 30 Stat. 544, 553, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682; Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 69, 52 Stat.
840, 879 (later codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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items but rather on judicial interpretation of the purposes of the bankruptcy
laws.22 One purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to provide assets from which
the debtor's creditors could be paid the amounts due them. However, one need
not go much beyond basic common-law contract concepts to fulfill that goal. In
addition to the policy of making creditors whole, there was another, conflicting
social policy at work.2 3 It was deemed essential to permit the debtor once again
to become a productive citizen free from the burdens of past profligacy or bad
fortune.24
To maintain the balance of conflicting social policies reflected in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the courts were required to weigh the relative necessity of each piece
of a debtor's property to pay creditors' claims against the significance of the
property to a debtor's ability to live without public assistance. The resolution of
this question frequently hinged upon a determination whether the assets in ques-
tion were more appropriately connected to activities of the debtor that caused
bankruptcy or to the debtor's postbankruptcy survival. The test became one of
measuring whether each asset in question was "sufficiently rooted in the pre-
bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the [debtor's] ability to make an
unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property' under [Bank-
ruptcy Act section] 70a(5)."
25
In Segal v. Rochelle26 the United States Supreme Court had to determine
whether tax refunds resulting from operating loss carrybacks27 were sufficiently
22. Courts recognized early that the state law exemptions-the only applicable exemptions
under the Bankruptcy Act-were inappropriately harsh. The courts, therefore, sought additional
exemptions based on a debtor's reasonable expectations of what would be available to him or her for
the provision of future basic needs. For a discussion of this judicial creation of a federal "exemp-
tion," see Lee, Leading Case Commentary: Lines v. Frederick, 45 AM. BANKR. LJ. 115 (1971).
23. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), in which the United States Supreme Court,
recognizing the conflicting policies, stated:
The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may
possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition. To this end the term "prop-
erty" has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it
is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed. However, limitations on
the term do grow out of other purposes of the [Bankruptcy] Act; one purpose which is
highly prominent and is relevant in this case is to leave the bankrupt free after the date of
his petition to accumulate new wealth in the future.
Id. at 379 (citations omitted).
24. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), the United States Supreme Court refused
to allow the postbankruptcy garnishment of a debtor's wages, which had been pledged as security for
a prebankruptcy loan. The Court stated:
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those dependent upon him is in
the nature of a personal liberty quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right. To
preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental
private necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern. ... The new oppor-
tunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the purpose of the bankruptcy
act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value to the wage earner if he were
obliged to face the necessity of devoting the whole or considerable portion of his earnings
for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his
bankruptcy.
Id. at 245.
25. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
26. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
27. Under I.R.C. § 62 (1985) a taxpayer is permitted to deduct expenses incurred in the tax-
payer's trade or business or other activity entered into for profit during a taxable year to the extent of
1985]
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rooted in the prebankruptcy past to be properly treated as property of the bank-
ruptcy estate. Based upon the fact that the refund, although determined and
received in Segal after the bankruptcy proceeding began, was really the return of
money derived from the operation of the business that caused the bankruptcy,
the Court decided that refunds derived from operating loss carrybacks were
property of the estate. Thus, the refund was deemed sufficiently rooted in the
past to be more properly considered property of the estate than an asset needed
for a fresh start.28 The Court apparently concluded that the refund was more
reasonably considered a part of the cause of the bankruptcy than a part of the
debtor's postbankruptcy right to accumulate wealth for the future.
The same factors considered in determining the includability of tax refunds
under the old Act received judicial attention in determining whether or not pen-
sion benefits were property of the bankruptcy estate.29 Pension benefits are con-
nected to past wages in much the same way tax refunds are related to past
business operations. These benefits are derived from contributions made to a
pension plan by the debtor's employer as deferred compensation, by the debtor
out of wages paid to him or her, or by the debtor out of self-employment income.
Yet, unlike tax refunds that result from errors in calculation or unintended busi-
ness reversals, pension benefits are accumulated intentionally for the specific
purpose of providing a retiree with essential income during retirement.
Dealing with assets similar to pensions because of the method of their ac-
cumulation, the United States Supreme Court in Lines v. Frederick30 determined
that accrued but unpaid vacation pay held by the debtor's employer was not
property of the bankruptcy estate. The Court premised this conclusion on the
fact that accrued vacation pay was intended to provide the debtor and the
debtor's family sufficient assets to meet their needs during the annual period
when the employer was shut down or upon the debtor's termination of employ-
ment. Thus, the pay was akin to future wages. The Court posited:
the taxpayer's gross income for that taxable year. In the event that a taxpayer's expenses for any
such year exceed his or her income for that same period, I.R.C. § 172 (1985) permits them to be used
to offset net income in the three taxable years immediately preceding the year of loss-!e., "carried
back"-and in certain tax years following the year of loss.
28. Both the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Fournier v. Rosenblum,
318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re
Sussman, 289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961), had held that income tax refunds resulting from operating loss
carrybacks were not property of the estate. These courts had reasoned that because such refunds
depended on an operating loss in the current year, and because the extent of the loss could not be
determined until the close of the debtor's taxable year, a date subsequent to the filing for bankruptcy,
the refunds were not property of the estate at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Indeed, the "prop-
erty" did not come into existence until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court took an opposing view in Segal. It agreed that § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy
Act allowed the bankruptcy trustee to acquire only the property owned by the debtor as of the date
the bankruptcy petition was filed. The tax refund, however, represented property in existence prior
to the bankruptcy, even though the value of such property could not be calculated until some later
time. Segal, 382 U.S. at 379-80.
29. As one court noted, "Under Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, pension plan funds were
viewed as a wage substitute for some future period and, therefore, were not included within the
property of the estate." Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1982) (citations omitted).
30. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
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Since [such vacation pay] is a part of their wages, [it] is "a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic sys-
tem." Where the minimal requirements for the economic survival of
the debtor are at stake, legislatures have recognized that protection
that might be unnecessary or unwise for other kinds of property may
be required.
31
The Court decided that to include these funds as propertfy of the bankruptcy
estate would violate the policy of allowing a debtor a fresh start. Thus, the
Court excluded from property of the estate funds serving a purpose similar to
pension funds-substitute wages. To include these funds would have deprived
the debtor of the bankruptcy laws' promise of a "new opportunity in life and [a]
.. .clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preexisting debt."
'32
Despite its decision in Lines the Supreme Court has made clear that not
everything having its origin in wages, if merely set aside, will be deemed a wage
substitute. In Kokoszka v. Belford 33 the Supreme Court determined that
overwithheld income taxes refunded after the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings were property of the bankruptcy estate. The Court's conclusion
was based on the distinction between funds related to wages that were merely
saved and wages set aside specifically to take the place of wages in the future.
This distinction, although not specifically made by the Court, was really one
between savings for items other than necessities and the accumulation of assets
essential for basic necessities and support on retirement or disability.34 The
Court clearly found that an item rooted in wages would be excluded from prop-
erty of the bankruptcy estate only if it were "designed to function as a wage
substitute at some future period and, during that future period, [were intended]
to 'support the basic requirements of. . .[a debtor's life].' -35
The wage substitute line of reasoning found its way directly into determina-
tions involving pension arrangements. In deciding that pension benefits did not
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy if such benefits were maintained by the debtor's
employer in tax qualified pension and profit sharing plans, 36 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that such benefits were to be
regarded as future wages necessary to provide the debtor with the basic require-
ments of life.37 However, the bankruptcy courts were, and continue to be, less
31. Id at 20 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969)); see also Ten-
nessee Valley Auth. v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944) (vacation pay that is not accessible until
a vacation is taken is similar to future wages).
32. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
33. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
34. For all practical purposes total disability and retirement are synonymous. Almost all pen-
sion arrangements provide that a participant will be permitted to take distribution of vested benefits
upon disability. This arrangement is permitted by Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1963).
35. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 648 (quoting Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970)); see also
Segal, 382 U.S. at 379 ("future wages of the bankrupt do not constitute 'property' at the time of
bankruptcy").
36. For an explanation of the term "tax qualified," see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
37. See Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981). Turpin, although de-
cided subsequent to the effective date of the new Bankruptcy Code, was decided under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act. Because the court did not say whether the debtor was a stockholder of the professional
1985]
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willing to accept the wage substitute argument in the case of Keogh plans38 and
individual retirement accounts (IRAs).39
The courts, in evaluating IRA and Keogh plans, did not deny the future
wage substitute aspects of these pension vehicles.4° Rather, the courts were con-
vinced that the ability of the debtor to gain access to plan assets after debts had
been discharged in bankruptcy but before retirement removed these cases from
the wage substitute analysis and required that such funds be viewed as currently
accessible to the debtor.
4 1
The courts attempted to establish certain objective standards to deal with
the distinction between assets excluded from the bankruptcy estate because of
their necessity for the debtor's fresh start and those includable because of their
accessibility to the debtor. Some of the standards that were established were
corporation that maintained the retirement plans, it is not clear how this factor may have affected
the decision. In other cases a debtor's control of distributions from the plan has resulted in plan
assets being included in the bankruptcy estate. See infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
In Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975), an earlier case de-
cided by the same court but not involving debtor control of the plan's sponsor, a wife who lent
monies to the marital community during the marriage was awarded monies representing the loan
when the parties divorced. She was given a lien against the husband's Navy retirement benefits as
security. Thereafter, the husband declared bankruptcy and sought to exclude his pension benefits
from his bankruptcy estate so that his ex-wife would be denied assets from which her loan could be
repaid. The court held that the pension benefits were not to be included in the bankruptcy estate
because they were a wage substitute, but found that repayment of the "loan" was alimony and thus
not a dischargeable debt under Texas law.
38. A Keogh plan is a retirement plan that is similar to a corporate pension or profit sharing
plan, but is maintained by a sole proprietorship or partnership. Keogh plans are authorized under
ERISA and are tax exempt under LR.C. §§ 401, 501 (1985). A penalty tax is imposed upon a
participant in a Keogh plan who withdraws certain monies therefrom before attaining age 59 1/2 if
the participant owns more than five percent of the sponsor of the subject Keogh plan. See Id.
§ 72(m)(5).
39. An individual retirement account is a retirement plan that can be maintained by an individ-
ual, whether employed or self-employed. Contributions to an IRA are tax deductible to the individ-
ual who maintains the IRA under .LR.C. § 408 (1985). Any amounts withdrawn from an IRA prior
to the attainment of age 59 1/2, death, or disability are subject to a 10% penalty tax. Id. § 408(0.
40. See In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (Keogh account is a contingent
future interest); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94, 96 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978) (purpose of IRA
is to "put funds away for future use").
41. After reviewing cases involving tax loss carrybacks, income tax withholding, vacation pay
plans, and government retirement plans, the court in In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94
(Bankr. D. Or. 1978), decided to include the debtor's ILA as property of the estate:
While the ostensible purpose of establishing an IRA is to put funds away for future use
when the depositor is retired and in need of a substitute for wages, this Court is convinced
that to treat an IRA as a substitute for future wages would be incorrect. In each of the
foregoing cases [analyzed by the court] where the asset was determined to be a substitute
for future wages, the bankrupt had only limited control over the fund so that there was a
substantial certainty that the funds would be used at a time when a wage substitute was
necessary.
Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
Two years later the same bankruptcy court reached a similar conclusion in In re Mendenhall, 4
Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980), which involved a Keogh plan rather than an IRA. The court's
statement in that case that "ft]he Keogh plan in the case at bar provides for withdrawal of contrib-
uted funds at any time.. .," id. at 129, however, is confusing because such a provision would have
resulted in denial of the plan's tax exempt status. See I.R.C. § 401 (1985). The court might have
believed, as it did in Mace, that the relatively small withdrawal penalty imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code or by the plan itself was insufficient to make the plan anything more than a savings
arcount.
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based on whether payments were to be made "during a time when the pensioner
may well have no or few other sources of income,"42 whether payments were
intended to substitute for wages during times when the employee was laid off,43
whether the debtor had the right to withdraw money from a pension fund prior
to retirement,44 and whether the funds from which payments were made were
based upon hours worked.45
B. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The primary focus of the Bankruptcy Code enacted in 19784- is not on the
question of includability of property in the debtor's estate but rather on the stat-
utory exemptions from creditor access provided for property that is part of the
estate.47 However, much of the same reasoning that was applied to the issue of
includability under the former laws is applied under the new laws to the ques-
tion of exemption.
48
The current bankruptcy code provides that the estate of a debtor consists,
essentially, of every kind of interest in property possessed by the debtor prior to
bankruptcy;4 9 the term "property" is to be given its widest and most expansive
42. Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1975).
43. Electrical Workers v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979). In
this nonbankruptcy case, an employees' credit union attempted to garnish benefits under a vacation
trust fund. The employer made periodic payments into the fund to provide benefits during the
employee's holidays when the employee probably would not otherwise receive compensation. These
funds were subject to garnishment because the payments were clearly intended to be wage
substitutes.
44. See In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978).
45. Electrical Workers v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979).
46. For a description of the legislative history of the Act, see supra note 1.
47. In a thorough review of the then-proposed bankruptcy act, which later became the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see supra note 1, Plumb stated that "[tihe ... Commission [on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States] would eliminate transferability, leviability, and contingency
as tests of whether property of the debtor would pass to the estate. The question of pension rights,
therefore, would be dealt with strictly as a matter of exemption." Plumb, supra note 16, at 57.
48. The same analysis that applied to the Bankruptcy Act's notion of includability is appropri-
ate in an analysis of exemption under the Bankruptcy Code because the fresh start concept was, in
reality, a common law addition to the list of exemptions permitted under the Bankruptcy Act.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). This section, entitled "Property of the Estate," reads in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor
in property becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of
this section notwithstanding any provision...
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor, or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on
the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or the taking
possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian, and that effects or gives
an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in
property.
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.
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meaning.50 Thus, even arguably contingent claims such as a debtor's potential
tax refunds5 1 have been held to be property of the estate under the Bankruptcy
Code.52 Generally, the Code relies on a specific set of exemptions designed to
give the debtor a fresh start to ameliorate the harsh effects of this all-inclusive
definition.53 However, the Code's definition of property is slightly relaxed by




From the rather expansive language of the statute and the equal breadth
accorded such language by the courts, there should be little question of the in-
clusion in the bankruptcy estate of a debtor's interest in a pension, profit shar-
ing, or other kind of retirement arrangement. 55 However, because Bankruptcy
Code section 541(c)(2) excludes from the bankruptcy estate the debtor's interest
in a trust that has restrictions on transfer enforceable under nonbankruptcy
50. See In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). "The scope of [Bankruptcy
Code § 541] is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property,
causes of action, and all other forms of property formerly specified in § 70(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act." Id; see also Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 918
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[The Code broadens what is included in the bankruptcy estate by elimi-
nating Act concepts of leviability, transferability, vested title and fresh start."); Joelson v. Tiffin Say.
Bank (In re Everhart) 11 Bankr. 770, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) ("Section 541 expressly includes
in the estate all the property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start.").
51. In re DeVoe, 5 Bankr. 618 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). In DeVoe, even though the bank-
ruptcy filing preceded the end of the debtor's tax year, the court included in the bankruptcy estate
the debtor's purely contingent interest in a potential tax refund for that year.
52. One court has stated that "[the [Bankruptcy] Code broadens what is included in the bank-
ruptcy estate by eliminating Act concepts of leviability, transferability, vested title and fresh start
policies .... Though state law will define the debtor's legal and equitable interests, the issue of
what is property of the estate is a federal issue." Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt)
20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Kan.), rev'd, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982) (on reversal, court held em-
ployer's contributions to pension fund were not included in bankruptcy estate). Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act "a bankrupt's beneficial interest in a trust was not part of the estate if the interest could
not be transferred or levied upon under state law." Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d
1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
During its deliberations over the Bankruptcy Code, Congress indicated that the definition of
property under § 541(a)(1) "includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that
needed for a fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to
exempt it under proposed 11 U.S.C. § 522, and the court will have jurisdiction to determine what
property may be exempted and what remains as property of the estate." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978); H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977).
53. As one commentator stated:
There was general agreement among the critics of the 1898 Act that straight bank-
ruptcy failed to give debtors a "fresh start," or a new beginning ....
The Code, therefore, provides for the first time a federal exemption which the debtor
may elect in preference to his state exemption, unless a state forecloses this option ....
Goetz, Consumer Bankruptcies Should Ability-To-Pay Condition Bankruptcy Relief?, 27 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. Rav. 705, 712-13 (1982).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982) provides: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a
case under this title."
55. As will be discussed in this Article, even if pension trusts are property of the estate the
assets of such trusts may qualify for federal or state exemptions. See infra notes 120-39 and accom-
panying text (Section IV).
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law,56 there is a question whether pension trusts are excludable. Section
541(c)(2)'s language describes, without actually labelling, a spendthrift trust;
therefore, the more specific issue in excludability is whether a pension arrange-
ment may be characterized as a spendthrift trust or as a trust similar enough to a
spendthrift trust to be excluded under section 541(c)(2).
5 7
A. Brief Explanation of ERISA Plans
To understand the problem created by the language of Bankruptcy Code
section 541(c)(2) as it relates to retirement arrangements, it is first necessary to
have a basic understanding of how such arrangements are established and main-
tained. There are numerous types of retirement plans, including profit sharing,
pension, and thrift plans. All of these plans have different characteristics relat-
ing to whether the employer, the employee, or both make contributions;58 who
assumes the risk of investment loss;59 and the amount of the benefits ultimately
to be paid to a plan participant. Despite these differences, however, all retire-
ment plans have beneficial tax consequences if maintained in a trust or invested
in some form of retirement annuity that meets the requirements of the Internal
56. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982); see supra note 49 (text of § 541). Regarding a nonpension
trust, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky has stated:
Where property is held in trust for the debtor, the estate created under Section 541 suc-
ceeds to any interest of the debtor in the trust estate or fund, except as noted in Section
541(c)(2) [of the Bankruptcy Code] ....
Thus, property of the estate will include the debtor's beneficial interest in the trust
estate unless there is a valid restriction on the transfer of that interest which would be
enforceable under nonbankruptcy law.
Avery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Klayer (In re Klayer) 20 Bankr. 270,272 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
Under this analysis a pension trust would not be considered property of the bankruptcy estate if it
were deemed a trust that under nonbankruptcy law has sufficient restrictions inhibiting the debtor-
beneficiary's ability to assign or transfer pension benefits.
57. See infra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. § 401 (1985) sets forth requirements for tax-qualified pension, profit-sharing, and
stock bonus plans. I.R.C. § 412 (1985) establishes the minimum amounts that can be contributed
annually by employees and employers to corporate or Keogh pension and profit sharing plans, and
I.R.C. § 415 (1985) establishes maximum amounts. An employer may deduct annual contributions
to a retirement plan in accordance with limitations set forth at I.R.C. § 404 (1985). I.R.C. § 408
(1985) authorizes establishment of IRAs under which employees maintain retirement plans in-
dependent of any plan maintained by their employers, and I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (1985) generally limit
to $2,000 annually the amount that can be contributed to an IRA.
59. In defined contribution plans the plan participants bear the risk of investment loss. Both
money purchase pension plans and profit sharing plans are defined contribution plans. Profit sharing
plans are plans to which employers make contributions of a discretionary amount of their profits,
and money purchase pension plans are plans to which employers make contributions equal to a fixed
percentage of participants' compensation. Both provide that a participant will receive benefits on
retirement, or other appropriate date, equal to his or her share of the aggregate employer contribu-
tions, together with any income earned by such contributions from the date of contribution to the
date of withdrawal. If the plan has been well invested the participant will receive a large distribution
of assets, but if the contributions have been poorly invested, the participant will receive a smaller
distribution of assets. In the most extreme case of investments gone sour a participant will receive
no distribution of assets.
Unlike a defined contribution plan, a defined benefit plan virtually guarantees its participants
specific benefits on retirement. The employer bears the risk of investment gain or loss in the defined
benefit form of retirement arrangement because if there are insufficient assets in the plan to make the
promised payout, the employer will have to make extra contributions. If the plan investments
should fare better than expected, the employer will be able to reduce the amount of contributions it
otherwise would have been required to make.
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Revenue Code.60
Retirement plans are established by a number of different individuals and
entities. Often the party establishing the plan and the plan's participants are
closely related; the company sponsoring the plan might have only one employee
who is also the company's sole stockholder, or a few highly paid employees who
are also the company's majority stockholders. An example of this type of em-
ployer-employee situation is a professional medical corporation of which the
doctor-employees of the corporation are its sole stockholders. The control over
such a corporation's pension plan and the pension's assets by the stockholder-
employees is obvious. Individuals establish, maintain, and have substantial con-
trol over their own IRAs. The individual who owns the IRA is also solely re-
sponsible for making contributions to the plan. These contributions generally
are based on the individual's annual compensation, but are unrelated to any
specific employment.6 1 Plans are also established by employers who are unre-
lated to their employees other than in the respective employer-employee capac-
ity. These plans frequently deny control over investment or withdrawal of plan
assets to any beneficiary.
Each of these plans creates different problems of analysis in the determina-
tion whether a beneficiary's benefits are available to creditors in bankruptcy.
Differing relationships among the employee, the employer, and the plan lead to
different degrees of control over plan assets by a beneficiary. The issue of con-
trol is central to the courts' view of whether benefits to be paid by the plan
qualify for exclusion under section 541(c)(2) and thus of the availability of such
assets to creditors.
62
B. ERISA Plans as Spendthrift Trusts
Spendthrift trusts "provide for a right in a beneficiary to future income or
principal of the trust, but also [provide] that his right to receive these payments
in the future shall not be transferable by him or liable to be taken for the pay-
ment of his debts." 63 The degree of enforceability of the spendthrift provision of
a trust varies from state to state.64 The difficulties in defining trusts related to
60. I.R.C. § 501 (1985) exempts from taxation pension arrangement trusts that meet the re-
quirements of I.R.C. § 401 (1985). Only contributions to trusts qualifying under I.R.C. §§ 401, 501
(1985) and certain custodial accounts and insurance contracts are deductible under I.R.C. § 219
(1985) or I.R.C. § 404 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 66-70 for a discussion of the
requirement that pension arrangement assets be held in trust.
61. I.R.C. § 219 (1985) allows an individual a tax deduction for limited contributions to a plan
that meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 408 (1985). IRAs must be trusts or custodial accounts,
which may have banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, or other entities that meet
certain stringent requirements as trustees. See id. §§ 408(a)(2), 408(n), 581; see also Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.401-12 (1968) (requirements for Keogh plans); 1d. § 1.408-2 (1980) (general rules governing
IRAs).
62. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
63. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDiBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 147 (5th ed. 1973).
64. Professor Scott has noted:
[I]n many states a restraint on the alienation of the right of a beneficiary to receive the
income under a trust created by a person other than the beneficiary himself is valid
although there is no statute that so provides. On the other hand, in a few states it has been
held that spendthrift trusts are against public policy. In such states the trust is valid but
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retirement arrangements as spendthrift or spendthrift-like trusts, however, do
not appear to be due to the multiplicity of jurisdictions passing on the question;
rather, the difficulties arise because of the difficulty of fitting a retirement trust
within the traditional definition of a spendthrift trust.
Trusts related to retirement arrangements are not traditional spendthrift
trusts primarily because they are not established for the purposes generally asso-
ciated with such trusts. Spendthrift trusts are normally established by a person
who is concerned about the beneficiary's well being for the purpose of protecting
the beneficiary from his or her own improvidence.65 Unlike traditional spend-
thrift trusts, retirement related trusts normally are established by the individual
who is the plan's beneficiary, a corporation wholly or substantially owned by the
plan's beneficiary, or an employer otherwise unrelated to the beneficiary but who
maintains a retirement plan as part of its employees' compensation package.
Pension agreements often contain anti-alienation provisions, which resem-
ble the spendthrift provisions of spendthrift trusts. To be "tax qualified,"166 the
assets of a pension arrangement must be maintained in a trust that meets the
strict and multitudinous requirements of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 67
The requirement causing the greatest concern to the bankruptcy courts is that
the trust contain an anti-alienation provision. Section 401(a)(13) provides:
A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless
the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, there shall not be taken into account any voluntary
and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit
payment made by any participant who is receiving benefits under the
plan unless the assignment or alienation is made for purposes of de-
fraying plan administration costs.
68
If a retirement plan does not contain this "spendthrift" language it will not be
tax qualified, and consequently the employer will not be permitted a deduction
the attempt to restrain alienation by the beneficiary of his interest and to restrain his credi-
tors from reaching it is invalid.
2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRusTs 1139-41 (3d ed. 1967).
65. Professor Scott has described the relationship of a beneficiary to a spendthrift trust as
follows:
Trusts in which the interest of a beneficiary cannot be assigned by him or reached by his
creditors have come to be known as "spendthrift trusts." The term is not altogether felici-
tons, since it is quite immaterial whether or not the beneficiary is in fact a spendthrift. The
term does, however, connote the general idea that the purpose of the settlor in creating
such a trust is to protect the beneficiary against his own folly or inefficiency or misfortune.
It is useful, at any rate, as a short phrase indicating that the interest of the beneficiary is
subject to a restraint on alienation, whether the restraint is imposed by the terms of the
trust or by statute.
Id. at 1131.
66. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1985) defines a qualified trust as one that meets certain statutory require-
ments. I.t.C. § 404 (1985) requires that for employer contributions to a pension trust to be tax
deductible they must be made to a trust that is qualified under I.R.C. § 501(a) (1985). Section 501(a)
requires that in order for a trust to be exempt from tax it must be qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1985).
67. For the primary requirements, see I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 410, 411 (1985).
68. Id. § 401(a)(13). Similar language is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982).
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for its contributions.6 9 Distributions in violation of the dictates of the provision
presumably can lead to loss of the tax exempt status of the retirement arrange-
ment and the trust related to it.7
0
The language of I.R.C. section 401(a)(13) looks strikingly like language
describing a traditional spendthrift trust. The significance of the similarity for
purposes of the bankruptcy law is that Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) ex-
cludes from property of the bankruptcy estate the debtor's interest in a trust
from which an anticipatory assignment of an interest is restricted.71
The courts have had two problems in dealing with Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 541(c)(2) as it relates to tax exempt retirement arrangements. The first
problem is determining whether the statutory language is intended to include
restrictive trusts other than traditional spendthrift trusts. The second problem is
whether the trusts related to pension, profit-sharing, and similar retirement ar-
rangements are indeed spendthrift trusts.
1. Keogh Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts
Analyzing the appropriateness of applying section 541(c)(2)'s exclusion for
spendthrift trusts to assets of or benefits to be paid from retirement trusts, the
courts have focused on the type of plan involved and on the degree of control
exercised by the debtor over the operation of and the distribution of assets from
the plan. An IRA is established by the individual who is its beneficiary,72 and
Keogh plans are established by sole proprietorships or partnerships whose own-
ers are also plan beneficiaries. 73 The debtor has substantial control in both Ke-
ogh plans and IRAs because the establishment of the Keogh plan or IRA and its
continued maintenance is fully within the debtor's discretion. The debtor also
has complete control over whether to maintain, terminate, or contribute to an
IRA in any year74 and substantially complete control over maintenance of, ter-
mination of, or contributions to a Keogh plan.75 This control is a major factor
69. I.RLC. § 401(a)(13) (1985).
70. The IRS has taken the position that assignment to a debtor's creditor of pension benefits,
even in compliance with a court order, is cause for the disqualification of a retirement arrangement
that had been or otherwise would continue to be qualified as tax exempt. See PLR #8131020,
I.R.S. LTR. RurL. REP. (CCM) #8131020 (May 5, 1981); contra, Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.D. 85
(assignments of pension benefits in accordance with court ordered support payments held not to
disqualify a plan). The conflict between court ordered assignment and the I.R.C. restrictions on
transfer has recently been resolved in cases concerning marital dissolution by legislation discussed
infra at note 119, but it is still an open question in nonmarital dissolution cases.
71. See supra note 49 for language of § 541(c)(2).
72. See supra note 61.
73. LR.C. § 401(d) (1985), in conjunction with the definitions in I.RLC. § 401(c) (1985), allows
for the establishment of tax exempt Keogh plans and related trusts by self-employed individuals and
partners and generally treats such self-employed individuals and partners as employees for purposes
of contributions to the plan and plan administration. Unlike IRAs, see supra note 61, there are no
statutory restrictions on who or what can be a trustee of a retirement trust maintained by a Keogh
retirement plan. Keogh plans, like plans maintained by corporations, can be trusteed by individuals,
including the owner or partner of the company sponsoring the plan.
74. There are no statutory or regulatory requirements that contributions be made annually to
an IRA. Although there is no minimum contribution requirement, there is a maximum permitted
annual IRA contribution of $2,000. See I.LRC. § 219(b)(1), (c)(2) (1985).
75. Contributions to a Keogh profit sharing g plan are within the full discretion of the employer
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in courts' determinations that these pension arrangement trusts are not excluded
under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2).76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided in Goffv.
Taylor (In re Goff)77 that Keogh plan trusts do not constitute traditional spend-
thrift trusts and thus are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate by Bank-
ruptcy Code section 541(c)(2), despite the trusts' inclusion of the anti-alienation
provision required by ERISA. The court examined the meaning of section
541(c)(2)'s phrase "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" and con-
cluded that the language was intended to exclude from a debtor's estate only
traditional spendthrift trusts as recognized by the relevant state law.78 The
court's statutory interpretation is supported by legislative history, which sug-
gests that Congress intended to exclude as property of a debtor's estate only
assets of trusts cognizable as traditional spendthrift trusts under state law and
did not intend an exclusion for trusts that only take on the appearance of spend-
thrift trusts. 79 Although not stated in Goff, lurking in the background of the
court's decision is the debtor's right under the provisions of the plan to with-
sponsoring the plan. The IRS has imposed an administrative rule, which also applies to corporation
sponsored retirement plans, that if there are not at least nominal contributions annually to such a
plan it will be deemed to have terminated. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(d) (1977) provides:
A complete discontinuance of contributions under the plan is contrasted with a suspension
of contributions under the plan which is merely a temporary cessation of contributions by
the employer. A complete discontinuance of contributions may occur although some
amounts are contributed by the employer under the plan if such amounts are not substan-
tial enough to reflect the intent on the part of the employer to continue to maintain the
plan.
Congress has established maximum annual contributions. I.R.C. §§ 404, 415 (1985). Within
broad limits the sole proprietor or partner has full discretion as to the amount of contributions.
There is also discretion as to the amount of contributions for money purchase and defined benefit
pension Keogh plans, but the amount of contributions is fixed by formulae in the plan document.
However, the plan sponsor retains the right to amend this type of plan at any time. Such an amend-
ment could be for purposes of reducing contribution levels, although the IRS will not tolerate too
frequent changes to the contribution level.
76. Eg., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (control by debtor over
Keogh plan); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. CL Dec. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978) (control by debtor over
IRA assets).
77. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 580. The Goffcourt found "that Congress did not evidence an intent, by reference to
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' to include an ERISA plan exemption. Rather, [it found] that Con-
gress intended to exclude only trust funds in the nature of 'spendthrift trusts' from the property of
the estate." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982)).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6136 ("The bill also continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the
debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under appli-
cable State law.").
Congress rejected a more narrow exception for spendthrift trusts than the exception that finally
became Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2). The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws suggested that
spendthrift trusts be excepted from property of the estate only to the extent necessary for the reason-
able support of the debtor and his or her dependents. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 197-98 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY App. 2, 1-1, 197-98 (15th ed. 1979). The
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws was established by Congress to assist in revising the federal
bankruptcy laws. It is interesting to note that the Commission's proposal was not breaking new
ground in the inviolacy of spendthrift trusts, for numerous states have recognized the sanctity of
such trusts only to a limited degree. See generally 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 64, § 151 (discusses
conflict among states regarding validity and effect of spendthrift provisions in trusts).
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draw funds prior to retirement or death with relative impunity. s ° The scope of
the Goff decision, however, is limited. First, the court adhered to a strict inter-
pretation of what constitutes a spendthrift trust because it believed that Con-
gress did not intend to increase the ambit of the generally accepted definition of
that term. Second, the court was dealing with a beneficiary who was also the
trust's settlor, an arrangement under which spendthrift provisions have not been
recognized, 81 and which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, two years before Goff,8 2 had decided would not be permitted for Keogh
plans.
83
Although there appear to be no cases dealing with the spendthrift nature of
IRA trust provisions,8 4 because an IRA is so similar to a Keogh arrangement,
courts should treat them in a similar fashion. If a Keogh plan is not an excluda-
ble spendthrift trust, then it would be hard to find grounds to exclude an IRA.
2. Corporate Plans
Distinguishable from the Keogh plan and IRA cases are cases involving
plans maintained by corporations for the benefit of their employees. These plans
take many forms but in any form are distinguishable from IRA and Keogh plans
in that they are established and maintained by an entity other than the benefici-
ary. Thus, the argument that the assets of an IRA or Keogh plan are includable
in a debtor's estate because the settlor cannot be the beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust or because a beneficiary has too much control over the trust for it to be
deemed a spendthrift trust, is more problematic in the corporate plan setting.
In Samore v. Graham (In re Graham)8 5 the debtor was sole director of a
80. The version of I.R.C. § 72(m)(5) (1985) in effect when Goffwas decided imposed, in addi-
tion to any income taxes otherwise payable by a taxpayer, a tax of 10% of the amounts withdrawn
from a Keogh plan by an owner-employee prior to that individual's retirement, death, or other
termination of the plan. The section has been amended by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 237(d)(1)(A)-(d)(1)(C), (d)(2), (d)(3), 96 Stat. 324, 511-12
(1982), and the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 521(d), 98 Stat. 494, 868 (1984),
which have narrowed slightly the group upon which such penalties are imposed.
81. See 2 A. Scor, supra note 64, at 1190.
Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts are permitted, the settlor cannot create a
spendthrift trust for his own benefit. If the owner of property transfers it in trust to pay the
income to himself for life or for a period of years, and provides that his interest under the
trust shall not be assignable by him and that his creditors shall not be permitted to reach it,
nevertheless he can effectively assign his interest and his creditors can reach it.
Id.
82. See Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1981) (court noted the
"strong public policy... prevent[ing] any person from placing his property in what amounts to a
revocable trust for his own benefit which would be exempt from the claims of his creditors").
83. See also In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Keogh plan not exempt
under Bankruptcy Code when spendthrift trust was created for the settlor's own benefit).
84. In In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982), an IRA held in the form of an
annuity as permitted under I.R.C. § 408(b) (1985) was found to be an asset of the debtor's estate
primarily because it was not technically held in trust. The court in Howerton, answering the ques-
tion whether an IRA was exempt under a state exemption statute, stated that "[IRAs] are basically
tax deferrment [sic] plans over which the Debtors exercise a great deal of control. They may with-
draw the cash value of the annuity subject to a tax assessment at any time and there is no guarantee
the funds will be retained until retirement." Id. at 623.
85. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
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corporation that maintained a profit sharing plan of which he was the trustee. It
is not clear whether the debtor was the sole shareholder of the corporation,
although it appears that he was. Contributions to the plan were completely
within the discretion of the corporation and therefore of its controlling share-
holder.8 6 The court's conclusion that Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) en-
compasses only traditional spendthrift trusts, not profit sharing or pension
trusts, was based on strict statutory analysis. Control by the debtor of the profit
sharing trust essentially merged the interests of the plan trust and its beneficiary,
however, and probably was a motivating reason for the decision.
Even cases in which it is reasonably clear that the debtor is not in control of
the plan trust or the corporation sponsoring the plan can raise the issue whether
a pension arrangement trust constitutes a spendthrift or spendthrift-like trust.
In one instance a court refused to recognize a spendthrift trust when the debtor
had the right to withdraw his contributions from a plan to which both he and his
employer contributed, even though such withdrawal would cause the debtor to
forfeit deferred retirement benefits.8 7 Another court refused to find a similar
plan's trust to be a spendthrift-like trust because to the extent the debtor made
voluntary contributions to the plan he was a settlor for whom spendthrift provi-
sions would not apply under any circumstances.
88
An alternative view of excludability was presented in Clotfelter v. CIBA-
GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt),8 9 in which the debtor was a participant in an
ERISA plan sponsored by his employer. Under the plan the employer partially
matched plan contributions made by an employee. Reasoning that the assets of
the plan attributable to the debtor's contributions were not property of his bank-
ruptcy estate, the court stated:
Since Congress did not choose to use the term "spendthrift trust".
[in section 541(c)(2)] there is no reason to suppose that when the term
appears in the legislative history it should be taken as a term of art; it is
more reasonable to suppose that the term should be given its ordinary,
more general meaning as "inclusive of all trusts which bar creditors
from reaching a beneficiary's interest." 90
86. Id. at 1269. Like Keogh plans, corporate plans face no minimum contribution require-
ments. However, the IRS requires at least minimal annual contributions for the plan to retain its tax
exempt status. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(d) (1977). See supra note 75 for the language of the
regulation.
87. Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 922 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1983) ("[tlhe crucial factor is the debtor's unqualified right of withdrawal. [Because of this right
of withdrawal,] the profit sharing plan is not a traditional spendthrift trust.").
88. In re Wilson, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 844, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1977). Wilson was
decided under the Bankruptcy Act. Although the concept of property that was includable in the
estate was somewhat different under the Bankruptcy Act than under present law, the court's reason-
ing in Wilson is still relevant: "It is well settled that a spendthrift provision does not protect prop-
erty from creditors where the grantor established the trust for his own benefit with his own
property." Id. For a discussion of the definition of property under the Bankruptcy Act, see supra
text accompanying notes 22-45.
89. 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
90. Id. at 929; accord In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). In Pruitt the court
bolstered its argument by stating that "[w]hen a statute is clear on its face there is no need to resort
to legislative history." Id. at 331.
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The court concluded that if ERISA anti-alienation language is enforceable
against general creditors, then it is enforceable against trustees in bankruptcy
who attempt to bring retirement plan assets into the bankruptcy estate.
Although the court's reasoning did not reflect apparent congressional intent,9 1
the court was attentive to the conflict between the bankruptcy law policy of
paying creditors and the ERISA policy of protecting pension assets for retire-
ment and resolved the conflict in favor of protecting pension assets.
92
3. Effect of Impediments to Exercise of Control
The degree of a debtor's control over the disposition of pension assets, espe-
cially the ability to withdraw the assets prior to retirement, often has been the
persuasive factor in courts' unwillingness both to exclude the pension from the
estate and to exempt the pension from creditor collection. 93 Pre-retirement ac-
cess to and control of pension benefits lead to the characterization of funds as
tax deferred savings accounts rather than as wage substitutes. 94 An impediment
to the exercise of control that causes the debtor undue hardship, however, may
lead a court to allow exclusion of the pension assets from the estate.95
One court found sufficient hardship in a corporation sponsored profit shar-
ing plan that permitted an early distribution of benefits only upon a showing of
financial need caused by a serious medical or casualty emergency. 96 Even in
that case the court indicated that if access to the funds might cause their dissipa-
tion prior to retirement or severe emergency, the funds would be included in the
bankruptcy estate.97 Another case, decided under the old Act, concerned a pen-
sion plan that permitted voluntary withdrawal of vested benefits at any time.
However, an employee making such a withdrawal could not participate in the
plan for one year after the withdrawal and faced the potential forfeiture of his
91. See infra notes 112 & 114-19 and accompanying text.
92. Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929.
93. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1983) (inclusion of Keogh
plan assets under new Bankruptcy Code); Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker), 473 F. Supp.
746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (IRA funds not exempt when bankrupt retains substantial control over the
funds); In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (IRA not exempt under state ex-
emption scheme); In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981) (pension assets arc not
exempt from creditor collection under state exemption for pensions); Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re
Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (pension assets become property of the estate
under old Act); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978) (ERISA pension fund
exempt when fund is a spendthrift trust beyond the reach of employee or employee's creditors).
94. See In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. 536, 537 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981) (applying a state exemption
for pensions, court noted that even though pension arrangements are granted as benefits, these ar-
rangements are nevertheless nothing more than savings accounts).
95. Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker), 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
96. Id. at 751 (debtor permitted to borrow from the plan subject to substantial restrictions,
including repayment within three years and termination of plan participation).
97. Id. The court in Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981), explaining In re Parker, 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), stated:
Finding that these limitations on the bankrupt's control effectively precluded use of the
fund for any purpose other than the future support of the bankrupt and his dependents, the
Court [in Parker] concluded that the fund was intertwined with the bankrupt's ability to
make an unencumbered fresh start and that it should be preserved for his benefit rather
than the estate's.
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nonvested interest. These penalties were not considered to impose sufficient
hardship either to justify exclusion of the pension trust from the estate or to
permit an exemption. 98
Cases dealing with the control aspect of Keogh plans and IRAs rather than
corporation sponsored pension plans have been resolved much more easily be-
cause the only limitation on the ability to withdraw funds is a penalty of addi-
tional taxes. 99 Courts consider such an insignificant limitation as tantamount to
granting the debtor complete control of the pension funds' 0 0 and unfettered ac-
cess to the funds for current use.101
The withdrawal right is a significant issue because courts are concerned that
if plan assets are excluded from the bankruptcy estate or exempt from creditor
access the debtor will wait for bankruptcy court discharge of debts and then
withdraw pension funds for current use.10 2 If pension assets are too readily
available to the debtor, they are the same as any other assets accumulated for
current use. 103
The conclusion that debtor control over and access to pension assets should
be the determinative factor in deciding whether to exclude such assets from the
debtor's estate, while reasouably convincing from the perspective of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, is less persuasive when viewed against the backdrop of ERISA
98. In re Wilson, 3 Bankr. CL Dec. (CRR) 844 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (court focused primarily on
the withdrawal rights of the debtor, not on the fact that early withdrawal of some plan benefits might
cause a forfeiture of company contributions).
99. I.R.C. § 72(m) (1985) provides for imposition of a tax in addition to a taxpayer's normal
income tax in any year in which a pre-age 59 1/2 or pre-death distribution is taken from a Keogh or
corporate pension plan by one who is a five percent owner of the company sponsoring the pension
plan. The amount of this tax equals 10% of benefits distributed and included in the distributee's
adjusted gross income under any other provision of the I.R.C. The same treatment is provided for
early distributions from an IRA. Id. § 408(f).
100. See Goff, 706 F.2d at 588; Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. Eg., Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also
In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94,95-96 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978) (court refused IRAs the dignity
of being considered pensions, stating that "there has been no establishment of a pension system for
IRAs but merely an amendment of the Internal Revenue Code to provide certain tax benefits for a
disadvantaged group to encourage retirement savings"). The Mace court incorrectly construed the
purpose of the massive revisions to the pension laws made by ERISA. This court, like others, was so
concerned that funds were currently available to a debtor that it ignored the purposes for allowing
the funds to be accumulated. Once blinded to the latter concern, courts do not attempt to reconcile
the purposes of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code.
The same failure to reconcile ERISA and bankruptcy policies applies to benefits in a corporate
plan over which the employee has the right of unrestricted withdrawal. See Firestone v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 921-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (even when plan is
maintained by a corporation that debtor does not control, assets of pension plan derived from em-
ployee's own contributions that can be withdrawn at will are assets of estate).
102. See Goff, 706 F.2d at 588 ("Debtors could shelter funds in Keogh plans immediately before
declaring bankruptcy... and immediately after discharge of all debts withdraw such funds for their
own benefit."); Bass v. Shackelford (In re Shackelford), 27 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983)
("If exempt, I.R.A.'s could easily be misused by debtors attempting to keep money from creditors
until it could be otherwise diverted."); Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1982) (debtor not entitled to shelter funds pending bankruptcy declaration); see also 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 727 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (restrictions on discharge); cf. Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re
Parker), 473 F. Supp. 746, 751 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (debtor's pension assets are not assets of the estate
even though the right of early withdrawal existed only upon a showing of hardship).
103. See, eg., Hovis v. Wright (In re Wright), 39 Bankr. 623 (D.S.C. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 714
(4th Cir. 1985); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94, 97 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978).
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policy. Attempting to reconcile ERISA's policy encouraging accumulation of
assets for use upon retirement with the needs of a debtor's creditors in bank-
ruptcy, some courts have found that distributions to creditors from the debtor's
retirement plan have been legislatively sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code, even
though the distributions are technically in violation of ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions.' °4 Other courts, viewing ERISA as an impediment to be overcome
but not seriously considered, allow the Bankruptcy Code primacy over ER-
ISA 05 because ERISA does not prohibit early withdrawals of benefits from a
plan; it merely imposes a penalty for such withdrawals.
C. Assignment and Alienation in Non-Spendthrift Trusts
The issue whether pension assets are assignable, alienable, 106 or otherwise
within the debtor's unfettered control is also relevant to the determination
whether pension assets not excluded from the debtor's estate by section 541 may
nonetheless be exempted from creditor attachment by Bankruptcy Code section
522(b). 107 Section 522(b) permits a debtor to exempt from creditor attachment
certain property that is part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 by elect-
ing the federal scheme of exemption in section 522(d) or the exemption of the
debtor's state of domicile.108 If the debtor elects the state exemption system, in
addition to the property exempted by such state law, he or she also is permitted
to exempt any other property of the bankruptcy estate for which there is an
exemption under any federal nonbankruptcy law. 10 9
The courts have addressed the question whether the I.R.C. section
401(a)(13) prohibition of assignment or alienation of pension benefits, even if
insufficient to constitute a spendthrift trust, is an impediment to access imposed
by "other federal law" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section
522(b)(2)(A). The key to resolving this question is whether ERISA's anti-as-
signment and anti-alienation provisions are sufficient to prevent the debtor from
having access to the assets of the subject pension trust.
On its face, the broad language of Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(A)
includes any federal law that contains specific anti-alienation provisions. Con-
gressional intent, however, appears to be less expansive. In both Senate and
House of Representatives reports1 10 accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act
104. See, ag., Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 923
(Bankr. N.D. IlL. 1983).
105. See, eg., Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86, 89 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Talbert,
15 Bankr. 536, 538 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981); Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412,
417 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94, 95 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978).
106. See supra text accompanying note 68 for the relevant portion of the text of I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13) (1985). Nearly identical language is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982).
107. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the difference between exemptions and exclusions.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982).
109. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A). See infra note 120 for the language of the statute indicating what prop-
erty a debtor may exempt.
110. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787-5962; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963-6435.
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of 1978,111 a number of federal laws were listed as examples of laws that Con-
gress contemplated as having anti-alienation provisions that would remove the
assets from the purview of the Bankruptcy Code. 112 Courts have held that
"[w]hile the ... list was not meant to be exclusive... the failure of Congress
to include ERISA plan benefits [is] probative of Congressional intent that ER-
ISA was not a 'Federal law' upon which a [section] 522(b)(2)(A) exemption
could be based."
113
The federal laws listed in the congressional reports as providing exemptions
under Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(a) have in common the fact that the
benefits they affect are expressly made not subject to execution, levy, attachment
or garnishment.' 14 ERISA has no such provision; it merely provides that ER-
ISA plan benefits cannot be alienated or assigned." 5 In light of this distinction
in language and the specification in the congressional history, some courts insist
that the exemption of Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(A) does not include
ERISA.
16
An opposing viewpoint has been taken by at least one bankruptcy court.
11 7
This opposing viewpoint characterized the laws comprising the list of statutes
set forth in the congressional history as enforcing "nothing more than prohibi-
tions against assignment and alienation" 118 no matter what words actually are
used in imposing the restriction. This court, recognizing the tension between
ERISA and bankruptcy policies, looked for support to cases dealing with gar-
nishment, on the theory that "[to allow a creditor to garnish these plans would
undermine the protection that Congress intended to give to the plan
beneficiaries." ' "19
111. See supra note 1 for a description of the legislative history of the Act.
112. The Senate report set forth the following list:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104; Social security pay-
ments, 42 U.S.C. 407; Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42
U.S.C. 1717; Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601; Civil service
retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act death and disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. 916; Railroad Retirement Act annuities
and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L); Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); Special pensions paid
to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. 3101; and Federal homestead
lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 110, at 5861; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 110, at 6316
(identical list).
113. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'g 24 Bankr.
305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). In Graham the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed a Bankruptcy Court conclusion that Congress specifically had precluded creditor access to
Civil Service retirement benefits but had merely provided an anti-alienation provision in ERISA. See
also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1983) (court, in dicta, used list
quoted supra note 112 to substantiate an argument that because Congress did not include ERISA in
that list for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 522, it could not have intended to exclude ERISA plan
benefits from the estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541).
114. See eg., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982),
aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
115. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1985); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982).
116. E.g., Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
118. Id. at 235.
119. Id. at 236. The issue whether to allow garnishment of pension assets most often has arisen
in the context of marital dissolution. The cases frequently have involved situations in which either a
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IV. EXEMPTIONS
In addition to exemptions recognized by the Bankruptcy Code but also au-
thorized by nonbankruptcy federal law, the Bankruptcy Code itself provides ex-
emptions from creditors' claims for certain property necessary for a debtors'
fresh start.120 The debtor may choose between two sets of exemptions-federal
spouse has attempted to garnish a former spouse's pension distributions in order to collect court
ordered support or the court, as part of its divorce decree, has attempted to have the pension make
support payments to the spouse.
In the past courts sought to protect the plan participant's family by finding that the anti-aliena-
tion provision was meant to protect the family as well as the participant. In Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the Court recognized the need to protect a participant's family but was
required to hold that a pension was not subject to garnishment by a former spouse because the
pension was regulated under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231(t) (1982)).
The Railroad Retirement Act was amended in 1983 to provide that at least some of the benefits
thereunder could be treated, within judicial discretion, as community property or distributed in
accordance with an appropriate judicial decree of divorce. Railroad Retirement Solvency Act of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-76, § 419(a), 97 Stat. 411 (amending 45 U.S.C. § 231(m) (1982) by the addition
of subsection (b)(1)).
Generally the courts carved out, even in nonbankruptcy situations, an exception to the ERISA
anti-alienation rules on the ground that it is a significantly greater social goal to have spouses take
care of their families than to have spouses provide for their own retirement. See, eg., General Mo-
tors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1980); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146,
1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Given the former language of ERISA that it superseded state law, 29
U.S.C. § 1144 (1982 & Supp. I 1983) (amended 1984), and that benefits could not be assigned or
alienated, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) (amended 1984), courts were left with the
choice of putting a pension beneficiary's dependents on the street with no support or implying an
exception either to ERISA's anti-alienation provision or to ERISA's supersession provision. See
American Tel. & Tel. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (court implied exception to ERISA's
preemption of state law provision for family support payments).
The court-made exception to ERISA recently has been substantially affirmed by the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-397, § 204(a), (b), 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). This legislation
amended ERISA by allowing a state's domestic relations law to permit use of one's pension benefits
to pay spousal and child support, thus overriding the ERISA prohibition against assignment or
alienation ofpension benefits. See also Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (permit-
ting divorced wife's recovery from former husband's disability pension plan); Stone v. Stone, 450 F.
Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (permitting spousal recovery from employee benefit plan), aff'd, 632
F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
120. "The [Bankruptcy] Code... provides a list of exemptions and allows the debtor to take
advantage of more liberal state exemptions. The federal alternative exempts property of the debtor
which is generally recognized as necessary for ordinary life, and a so-called 'grubstake' exemption-
that is, a dollar amount also considered necessary to aid in the support of the debtor." 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRuTrcY 522.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1985).
The exemption provision of Bankruptcy Code § 522 reads in part:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from prop-
erty of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law
that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does
not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this
section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the
place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preced-
ing the date of the filing of the petition...
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan
or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent
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exemptions in section 522(d) and exemptions provided by the law of the debtor's
state of domicile. Thirty-five states, however, have opted out of the federal ex-
emption system, 12 1 and require their citizens to comply with the state's schedule
of exemptions.
If the debtor elects the federal exemption scheme, pension assets are subject
to exemption under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E).122 This section
permits exemption of "[t]he debtor's right to receive. . . a payment under a
. . . [pension arrangement to the extent] reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." 123 All other questions relating to
this section are secondary to the ultimate dictate of the policy of exemptions-
providing a "fresh start." A fresh start is most important to one who is in finan-
cial need, a circumstance that can safely be assumed if an individual is in bank-
ruptcy. 124 The meaning of "fresh start" in the context of section 522(d)(10)(E)
depends on courts' willingness to find that a debtor's future needs can be met
only by current pension assets.
The exemption is not intended to insure the debtor and the debtor's family
against any future contingency that could inflict further financial harm or dis-
comfort. 125 The exemption is intended to assure the debtor "that assets to
which he may become entitled in the future will be acquired free of any prebank-
ruptcy obligations."' 26 Courts have attempted to establish criteria for the pur-
pose of setting out benchmarks against which the parameters of the "reasonably
necessary" standard of section 522(d)(10)(E) can be set. 127 The primary crite-
rion is that the amount exempted, together with the debtor's presumed earnings
until retirement, must be sufficient to allow the debtor to sustain basic needs
upon retirement 128 and be available to meet those needs.
129
Some courts have determined that because the debtor has no right to cur-
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless
* * * [exception stated].
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). The exception applies if the plan was established by an insider, the payment
is due to age or length of service, and the plan does not qualify as tax exempt under I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1985). 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(i)-(Mii) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6316 (listing federal plans under which
debtor might exempt).
121. COLLIR BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION GUIDE 1 & n.6 (L. King ed. 1984).
122. See supra note 120 for the language of the statute.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982).
124. The same may not be the case in corporate bankruptcies in which the petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed to avoid legal responsibilities. See, eg., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188
(1984) (debtor-in-possession was permitted to avoid an executory collective bargaining agreement
under a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code). Bildisco essentially was over-
ruled by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 541, 98 Stat. 333, 390-91 (1984), which added 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985).
125. See In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis.
1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
126. Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1981).
127. In a compromise between the House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which
allowed an exemption for all pension plan assets vested in a debtor, and the Senate version, which
would have left the exemptions entirely up to state discretion, the Act as finally adopted exempted
only pensions to the extent "reasonably necessary." For an excellent summary of the legislative
history of the Act, see Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101, 105-06 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
128. Id. at 107; see also In re Grant, 40 Bankr. 612, 613-14 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (basic needs
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rent payments under a pension arrangement, the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemp-
tion is not available.13 0 These courts apparently have concluded that the fresh
start concept can only accommodate present need and cannot be reconciled with
payments to be received in the distant future. They find it inappropriate to deem
the "reasonably necessary" requirement of Bankruptcy Code section
522(d)(10)(E) met if the debtor is relatively young and gainfully employed.1 31
These courts view the exemption as available only to "protect the fresh start of
the debtor following bankruptcy, not to insure that no future misfortune could
possibly lower the standard of living to which the debtor's dependents have be-
come accustomed."'
132
Some courts view pension benefits as reasonably necessary to assure a fresh
start, and thus inviolable, regardless of the length of time between a debtor's
bankruptcy and retirement. 33 As one court noted:
[A]warding the bankrupt's retirement benefits to the trustee [in bank-
ruptcy] would deprive the bankrupt of a genuine fresh start not be-
cause of the bankrupt's immediate need for the funds but because to
recognize the trustee's claim against the funds would leave a cloud of
prebankruptcy debt hanging over the bankrupt's future. Providing the
bankrupt with a 'fresh start' means assuring him that assets to which
he may become entitled in the future will be acquired free of any
prebankruptcy obligations. Future wages may not be garnished to pay
those obligations and pension benefits received in the future, even
though they may be the product of prebankruptcy contributions to a
pension fund, are a substitute for future wages and thus pass to the
bankrupt free of the claims of prebankruptcy creditors.' 34
not related to former lifestyle, but should take into account special needs of debtor). The court in In
re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) analyzed the criteria as follows:
[B]ecause of the small amount involved and because of the existence of. . .[the debtor's]
pension plan and the right to social security and his age, he has no foreseeable future need
to withdraw funds from the profit sharing plan. Thus I find that none of the debtor's profit
sharing plan is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor.
Id. at 551.
129. Walker v. Treadwell (In re Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1983) (social secur-
ity payments, although essential to "insure [that] the needy have the necessary resources for continu-
ing basic care and maintenane... . [are not to be exempt when] the statutory objective of
preserving essential resources for the debtor could not have been effectuated" by exempting them).
130. See, eg., In re We.r r, 31 Bankr. 418, 422 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Kochell, 26
Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564
(7th Cir. 1984); In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 828 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
131. See, e.g., In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (48 year-old school teacher
debtor actively engaged in profession and continuing to make contributions to state sponsored pen-
sion plan); In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (44 year-old debtor earning $1500
per month in excess of his needs at the time of the bankruptcy petition), aff'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D.
Wis. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (debtor practicing medicine at time of bankruptcy filing).
132. In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis.
1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984). "The exemption of future payments... demonstrates a
concern for the debtor's long-term security which is absent from the statute." Clark v. O'Neill (In re
Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983).
133. See, eg., Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1981); see also supra
notes 124-26 and accompanying text (purpose of exemptions is to ensure the debtor a "fresh start").
134. Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1981) (decided under the
Bankruptcy Act).
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Of course when the debtor is older and receiving or soon to qualify to re-
ceive distributions from a retirement arrangement, it is not difficult to determine
whether such funds are "reasonably necessary" for the debtor's maintenance
and support.13 5 However, when the debtor is young and employable, particu-
larly if employed in a profession in which high earnings are anticipated, courts
are less willing to find pension funds that will become available in the distant
future "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor." This conclusion is
particularly accurate when the assets are maintained in an IRA, a Keogh plan,
or a plan maintained by a corporation in which the debtor owns all or a majority
of the stock. In these circumstances courts have shown reluctance to ignore the
debtor's easy access to the funds for acquiring nonnecessities once the bank-
ruptcy proceedings are completed. 13 6 This concern is predominant, even though
the language of section 522(d)(10)(E) exempting "the debtor's right to re-
ceive" 13 7 a pension anticipates future payments. When the date of retirement is
too far in the future, courts are unwilling to exempt pension assets from collec-
tion for the same reason that pension assets were included in the bankruptcy
estate under pre-1978 bankruptcy law-the debtor's control of and easy access
to the assets. 138 In addition, courts have the equitable concern that to protect
those who have pensions while not protecting those who place money in tradi-
tional savings or other accounts for future use is unfair.
139
Perhaps the solution to the dilemma the courts face in resolving the issue of
what is reasonably necessary for support lies not entirely with the bankruptcy
laws, and perhaps this possibility explains the discomfort the courts display in
135. See, eg., Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1983) (remanded for further fact finding as to whether low income, 56 year-old debtor had
sufficient financial need to qualify for Illinois exemption similar to the exemption in Bankruptcy
Code § 522(d)(10)(E)); see also In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Donaghy
the debtors were a 62 year-old husband in ill health and his 64 year-old wife who had cancer. They
were required by their pension plan to take immediately a lump sum distribution of benefits accrued
or to delay taking any benefits for three years, at which time they would receive monthly benefits.
The debtors took the lump sum distribution, apparently out of need and concern that they would not
be alive in three years to receive monthly benefits. The lump sum distribution was placed in a bank
account prior to the debtors' filing a bankruptcy petition. Although the money was no longer in a
pension plan under colorable protection of Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E), the court applied the
exemption because to do otherwise would "[elevate] form over substance. . . .This sum is intended
to function as a wage substitute at some future period and. . . the lump sum pension payment is
reasonably necessary for their present and future support during their declining years." Id. at 680.
This decision appears to be the most expansive interpretation of the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption, but
the decision may well be limited by the extreme facts of the case.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 93-105.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982).
138. Analysis of whether a pension fund constitutes a wage substitute is based on the differentia-
tion between accumulation of assets for current purchases and accumulation of funds for provision
of basic needs in the future. It is clear that a debtor's lack of control over accumulated funds is the
criterion on which many courts rely in excluding and exempting pension benefits because the inabil-
ity of the debtor to use such assets currently ensures their availability as future wage substitutes.
139. As one commentator has stated:
[T]here is no reason to protect those whose employers have maintained a qualified pension
or profit-sharing plan and those who were eligible and willing to make similar provision for
themselves under "H.R. 10," while denying such protection to those who were eligible for
neither or who chose to provide for their old age by other means.
Plumb, supra note 16, at 95.
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dealing with this matter. The policy motivations for Bankruptcy Code sections
522(d)(10)(E) and 541 are best understood when evaluated in conjunction with
the purposes of the law with which they keep colliding, ERISA. Both the issue
whether a pension plan trust is deemed a spendthrift trust and the question
whether its assets are "reasonably necessary" for a debtor's support are best
determined by considering the purposes for which Congress encourages the
maintenance of retirement arrangements.
V. RELATIONSHIP OF BANKRUPTCY LAW TO PENSION LAW
That Congress considers the provision of pension benefits an important so-
cial goal is clear from the legislation developed to promote the use of and protect
the benefits under retirement arrangements. ERISA 14° was developed as a re-
sponse to a perceived need to regulate what was becoming, at the time the legis-
lation was being considered, one of the largest pools of investment assets in the
United States.
A. Purpose of ERISA
Through passage of ERISA Congress sought to assure that participants in
existing plans knew what they were supposed to receive and then actually re-
ceived the anticipated benefits.141 Congress also sought through ERISA to pro-
vide benefits for a wider group of citizens1 42 and to assist retirees in maintaining
at least a minimal standard of living14 3 by securing greater benefits for retirees
than would be available under Social Security. 144 Congress' intent is evident
from the statements of legislators immediately preceding the vote adopting
ERISA. Senator Jacob Javits of New York, one of ERISA's primary sponsors,
stated that "the pension reform bill is the greatest development in the life of the
American worker since social security. For the first time in our history most
140. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
141. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832-33 (1974).
142. Id. § 202, 88 Stat. at 853-54 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)); see also
Leaders of Senate Labor Panel Pledge to Press Pension Reform Measure This Year, N.Y. Times, Feb.
28, 1972, at 19, col. 2. I.R.C. § 410 (1985) is a similar provision. To implement congressional policy
to allow as many people to participate in pension arrangements as possible, § 410 provides that in
order for a pension arrangement to be given tax exempt treatment, it must allow almost all employ-
ees who have attained a minimum age to participate. Cf. id. § 401(a)(3) (as in effect in 1974) (refer-
ring to the minimum participation standards in § 410 as prerequisites for a qualified trust); Treas.
Reg. 1.401-3 (1974) (pre-ERISA tax provisions relating to tax preferenced pension plans).
143. See Ebbing Resources Social Security System Is on Its Way to Going Broke, Analysts Warn,
Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1975, at 1, col 6. (eastern ed.); The Forces Reshaping Social Sccurity, Bus. WK.,
July 15, 1972, at 54; Pension Increase Weighed By Panel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
144. Congressman Smith stated at 120 CONG. REc. 29,210 (1974):
There is a great need for private pension plans, deferred income plans, and other plans
which receive tax benefits as an encouragement to providing supplemental retirement in-
come.
Realistically, social security by itself is not likely to be sufficient to provide enough for
retirement income and the supplemental plans are very important.
Senator Beall commented that "[t]he bill seeks to protect the retirement benefits of the more
than 36 million Americans who are covered by private pension plans and to encourage Americans
not presently covered to provide for their own retirement through the granting of tax incentives."
Id. at 29,961.
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workers will be able truly to retire at retirement age and to live decently on their
social security, and private pensions."' 14 5 Senator Javits envisioned the pension
reform bill as a vehicle by which citizens could be assured of decent living condi-
tions on retirement. 146 Congressman Biaggi believed that ERISA "has one un-
derlying theme. It is a piece of legislation designed to protect and expand the
rights of all workers to a pension. It sets no geographic, social or economic
stipulations, but instead seeks to cover the gamut of working people under its
provisions."' 147
Congress chose to accomplish these social goals by conferring tax benefits
on those who save for retirement.148 Congress frequently has looked to the tax
code to encourage preferred social behavior either by forgiving or by deferring
taxes. 149 The use of tax incentives to promote behavior is time honored' 5 0 and
shows no less a congressional intent to induce the availability of a non-tax bene-
145. Id. at 29,933. Further on in his statement, Senator Javits detailed some case histories of
workers who were denied benefits due to minor violations of extraordinarily strict vesting and partic-
ipation requirements routinely made part of pension plans prior to the enactment of ERISA. This
was one abuse against which ERISA was aimed. Id. at 29,934.
146. Senator Javits stated:
This legislation will make better pension plans and undeniably, better pension plans will
make a significant contribution to the economic security of large numbers of older people
who need a much more realistic level of living in retirement. Even a substantially liberal-
ized Social Security could not do the job private pensions can do.
Right now-even with recent substantial increases in its benefits-sccial security is
just barely enough to support people, even at poverty levels. Nor do people save or invest
enough money over a lifetime. The result is they cannot really cope with soaring food costs
or any other forms of inflation.
Id. at 29,943.
147. Id. at 29,193.
148. Individual taxpayers are not required to include in their current year taxable income
amounts that are contributed by their employers to a tax qualified pension arrangement. See I.R.C.
§ 61, 402 (1985). They receive a tax deduction for amounts they contribute to Keogh plans. Id.
§ 219. These amounts are, however, includable in the taxable income of the taxpayer when distribu-
tions are made out of the plan. Id. §§ 72, 402, 408. If the taxpayer is in a lower tax bracket or if the
distributed benefits are taxed at a lower rate at the time of benefit distribution than at the time the
contributions were made, the taxpayer has avoided taxes on the amount contributed to the extent of
the difference. In addition, the taxpayer benefits by deferring taxation until retirement.
149. For example, as an inducement to taxpayers to increase their investment in capital assets,
Congress passed, as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat.
172, a new method of determining the amount of an asset's cost that a taxpayer could deduct in any
one year. The new method accelerated considerably over what would have been available under the
prior method of depreciation the amount of early year annual deductions. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168
(1958) (setting forth general guidelines for depreciation and accelerated cost recovery). Congress'
stated reason for the change was to resurrect a tax incentive that had lost its luster due to inflation.
The hope was that this new incentive would encourage taxpayers to replace old equipment and
structures, thus stimulating the economy. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAxATIoN, 97TH
CONG., IST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX Acr OF 1981, at
18-19 (Comm. Print 1981).
150. Congressman Al Uliman stated that "under this legislation, the favorable tax treatment
that has been so instrumental in encouraging the growth of nondiscriminatory plans over more than
three decades will continue." 120 CONG. REc. 29,198 (1974). The tax code is used as much to
channel investment as to produce income for the government. As one commentator has stated:
Virtually all provisions (of the tax code] that shield some income from the full impact of
...any tax ...were put there... (1) to provide greater equity. . . [and/or] (2) to
provide incentives to taxpayers to engage in or enlarge activities which are held to be desir-
able as a matter of public policy.
R. FREEMAN, TAX LOOPHOLES: THE LEGEND AND THE REALrrY 3-4 (1973).
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fit than if it had provided for the availability of such a benefit by direct legisla-
tion.15 1 Thus, it is not surprising that Congress selected the tax incentive
approach to induce employers to provide retirement arrangements for their em-
ployees and to induce employed and self-employed individuals to reduce a por-
tion of their savings to specially designated retirement funds. Despite the clear
congressional policy allowing citizens to accumulate assets for retirement, the
courts, when dealing with bankruptcy, generally ignore that policy in favor of
paying a debtor's creditors.
152
B. Appropriate Law Regulating Pension Arrangements
For purposes of bankruptcy law the election between state and federal ex-
emption systems is precisely what Congress intended for assets in general. 15 3
However, when the election is applied to pension assets, ERISA policy is under-
cut. Under the federal exemption system, the courts have been reluctant to find
that the exemption for pension assets applies. The courts express this reluctance
by defining the "reasonably necessary" requirement of section 522(d)(10)(E) in
very narrow terms. 154 All the states provide some degree of exemption for pen-
sion arrangements, but the state exemptions are not identical to each other or to
the federal exemptions. Thus the extent to which one's pension benefits are ex-
empt from creditors in a bankruptcy depends on the state in which bankruptcy
is filed. The existence of these exemption alternatives works at cross purposes
with the congressionally stated policy behind ERISA-to have all pension ar-
rangements regulated by a single law.
ERISA provides that it supersedes all state law affecting or relating to em-
ployee benefit plans.' 55 So important was this preemption doctrine to the over-
all fulfillment of congressional intention that one congressman pointed to the
provision as "the crowning achievement of this legislation . .. [because it
reserves] to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee
151. "Suggestions are constantly being made that many of our pressing social problems can be
solved, or partially met, through the use of income tax incentives." S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM 126 (1973). Professor Surrey went on to explain in this important and highly influential
work that socially desired behavior is induced by the government foregoing current revenue and the
taxpayer reducing his or her current cash out-flow by receiving a tax (monetary) benefit. He dubbed
this process one of "tax expenditure." Whether it is more likely that desired goals will be achieved
through direct expenditures by government or through the more indirect "tax expenditure" method
of conferring tax benefits is an interesting issue but one far beyond the scope of this Article.
152. See Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (court denied bankruptcy
exemption under a Keogh plan); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978);
National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 3, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979) (ERISA employee pension fund not exempt from judgment creditors).
153. See supra note 120.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 122-39.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) provides for supersession of state law by ERISA,
and § 1144(d) provides that ERISA does not "alter, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede" any
federal law relevant to this discussion. See also H.R. CoNn. REP. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5162 (emphasizing that ERISA supersedes
only state laws affecting employee benefit plans and is not designed to exempt individuals from any
state law that regulates insurance, banking, or securities).
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benefit plans." 156 Despite this strongly expressed intention of Congress that fed-
eral law regulate all matters relating to pensions, the courts deciding cases in
bankruptcy have split on the question whether the bankruptcy law, including
state exemption laws applied under Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(A), su-
persedes ERISA.
Some courts have decided that a debtor's interest in a pension plan is not
kept from the bankruptcy estate by ERISA when the debtor has chosen a state
exemption system and that system does not protect pension benefits. 157 In such
circumstances those benefits are protected only if the pension trust is considered
a spendthrift-like trust excluded from the estate under Bankruptcy Code section
541(c)(2) 158 or if ERISA is considered "other Federal law" under Bankruptcy
Code section 522(b)(2)(A). 15 9 Thus, ERISA's preemption of state law is under-
mined by allowing the various states to make their own rules regarding the regu-
lation of ERISA plan benefits and by allowing the debtor to select state rather
than federal exemptions. ERISA was specifically intended to preclude this situ-
ation. If there is some overwhelming reason to read an exception into ERISA,
such as an implied exception for a spouse to provide support for his or her fam-
ily,16° that exception can be tolerated. However, if there is no overwhelming
and conflicting social or legislative policy, it is hard to look approvingly upon
judicial erosion of stated legislative intent.
16 1
VI. PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL RECONCILIATION OF BANKRUPTCY AND
ERISA POLICY
Currently, if a debtor selects, or is forced to use, a state exemption system
that does not adequately protect pension assets from creditors, the debtor may
attempt to exclude such assets from property of the bankruptcy estate under
Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2). This approach, however, has been singu-
larly unsuccessful because it requires courts to view pension trusts as spendthrift
156. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement by Rep. Dent). The Congressman went on to
say:
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by
eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation....
The conferees. . . applied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-
Federal regulation of employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of section... [1144 of
Title 29 of the United States Code] would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of
any State, subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality thereof.., which would
affect any employee benefit plan [other than those specifically not covered by ERISA].
Id.; see also id. at 29,933 (statement by Sen. Williams).
157. See, eg., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor
(In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 55-92.
159. See eg., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor
(In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 108-19 for a discus-
sion of whether ERISA qualifies as "other federal law."
160. For a discussion of current judicial and legislative positions on the leviability and
garnishability of pension benefits to fulfill family support obligations, see supra note 119.
161. Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Kan.), rev'd,
24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
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trusts, an approach courts generally have been unwilling to take.1 62 The debtor
also may attempt to have ERISA deemed "other federal law," thus exempting
pension assets under Bankruptcy Code section 522(b)(2)(A). The success of this
latter approach also is doubtful.
163
If the debtor elects to use the federal system of exemption, then section
522(d)(10)(E)'s exemption for certain pension benefits applies. However, the
availability of this section depends on whether the debtor can establish that the
amounts exempted are, or will produce income that is, "reasonably necessary"
for support. 164
Despite the legislative vehicles extant, judicial protection of pension assets
from creditors is unlikely, at least in part because of a lack of concern for
ERISA policy in the context of bankruptcy. Furthermore, many courts inter-
pret the bankruptcy laws as inferentially overruling ERISA. This judicial stance
might be acceptable if the Bankruptcy Code were carrying out social policy
clearly more important than that surrounding ERISA. In the absence of such a
finding, however, courts should try to reconcile ERISA and the bankruptcy
laws.
Resolution of the conflict between creditors' rights in bankruptcy to acquire
debtors' assets and debtors' rights, both under bankruptcy law and under
ERISA, to protect assets for future needs would best be attained by remedial
legislation that specifically addresses the issues discussed in this Article. Never-
theless, absent such legislative initiative, the courts can reconcile the two areas
of the law through a more realistic and less narrow interpretation of existing
bankruptcy law. A reconciliation of pension and bankruptcy policy can be
achieved by judicial recognition that pension trusts are modified spendthrift
trusts and that pension policy demands that all citizens be permitted to protect,
even against creditors, some assets for retirement.
To permit individuals to have assets available for living expenses on retire-
ment is to recognize that society ultimately will be forced to pay for the care of a
retiree who does not have sufficient personal assets to provide the necessary re-
quirements of life. Society's overwhelming concern in this regard is manifested
in its willingness to defer collection of taxes on the portion of a taxpayer's in-
come that is saved in a pension trust until the taxpayer begins receiving pension
distributions.
To resolve the conflict between bankruptcy and ERISA policies, the courts
first must recognize that a retirement arrangement is composed of at least two
parts; one part is a traditional pension and the other part is a tax deferred, but
otherwise conventional, savings account. 165 One court, recognizing this distinc-
162. See supra text accompanying notes 55-92.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 108-19.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 122-39.
165. The use of the term "savings account" is admittedly an oversimplification. It is shorthand
for the various methods by which an individual invests funds and thereby postpones current con-
sumption in favor of future consumption of the "saved" assets. Acknowledgement of the two-part
nature of retirement arrangements was recently noted:
The [Senate] Finance Committee. . . will look at vehicles such as tax code Section 401(k)
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tion, suggested an equitable means to reconcile bankruptcy and ERISA policy:
"[A]lthough the anti-alienation clause required under an ERISA plan may bar
creditors from retirement benefits, it should not operate to bar creditors from the
present benefits included in a plan but not part of the retirement plan.
'166
The proposal that follows accepts this two part characterization of
ERISA qualified pension arrangements and suggests that to the extent the assets
of any retirement arrangement attributable to the debtor are tax deferred invest-
ments they should not be exempted or excluded from the bankruptcy estate. To
the extent the plan assets represent the accumulation of an amount necessary to
provide for reasonable needs upon retirement, they should be either exempted or
excluded from the debtor's estate. This approach permits the debtor to keep
property necessary for retirement as intended by ERISA while at the same time
permitting the debtor's creditors to have access to all the debtor's property not
needed for a "fresh start," thus satisfying the primary tenet of the Bankruptcy
Code. Furthermore, this approach carries out one of the primary objectives of
ERISA, applying a consistent federal law to the regulation of ERISA pensions
and pension benefits rather than one federal and fifty state laws.
The primary reason courts have been unwilling to treat pension trusts as
spendthrift trusts excluded from property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code
section 541(c)(2) is the concern that pension assets which the participant can
reduce to possession are likely to be used by the debtor immediately after the
termination of the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, courts reason, it would be
foolish to view these assets as retirement assets. Without this concern courts
might be persuaded to exclude at least a portion of a debtor's pension assets
from the bankruptcy estate or to exempt them from creditor attachment.
Under ERISA a debtor may well have substantial control, including the
right of pre-retirement withdrawal, over the assets in a pension trust. However,
that control and right of withdrawal is only permitted by ERISA; it is not re-
quired. There is no reason under ERISA that a pension plan, Keogh plan, or
IRA could not restrict the debtor's rights to borrow, pledge, distribute, or other-
wise use the funds of a retirement plan prior to retirement. If the bankruptcy
courts were to require that in order to exclude pension assets from a bankruptcy
estate or to exempt them from availability to creditors a pension trust be subject
plans and IRAs to see if they are being used for retirement savings or just for deferred tax
savings. ... [Senator Chafee noted] that the extent to which these programs are being
used solely as retirement income sources is not clear.
Packwood Wants No Tax on Benefits, But Sees Possible Limits on Social Security, 12 PENS. REP.
(BNA) No. 4, at 145 (Jan. 28, 1985).
166. In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983). Berndt dealt with the question
whether the profit sharing plan maintained by Sears, Roebuck and Co. for its employees was a
spendthrift trust under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2). Id. at 516. Under the plan the debtor had the
right to withdraw contributions, and it was those assets the trustee in bankruptcy sought to obtain.
Id. This author disagrees with the court's apparent categorization'of all assets over which the debtor
has control as "present benefits" not part of what is otherwise a "spendthrift trust" and the remain-
der of the assets as "future benefits" excluded because they are part of a "spendthrift trust." None-
theless, it is significant that at least one court has recognized that a retirement arrangement can have
more than one purpose and that these different purposes may have to be dealt with differently under
the Bankruptcy Code.
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to these restrictions, the control obstacle to protecting these assets in bankruptcy
would be eliminated.
A number of things should be considered in determining whether this ap-
proach is feasible. Under some circumstances debtors now are permitted to re-
tain exempt property acquired on the eve of bankruptcy. 167 Thus, even if the
courts allow for eve-of-bankruptcy amendments to pension arrangements to pro-
vide restrictions on asset accessibility, no harm will be done to existing bank-
ruptcy policy. In addition, and perhaps of most importance, the bankruptcy
courts already have the authority under Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E)
to exempt some pension benefits and assets despite the fact that they may be
subject to substantial rights of withdrawal or control by the debtor. The essen-
tial assumption of section 522(d)(10)(E) is that assets which are "reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor" will be available to the debtor to make a
fresh start. This assumption is made easily when assets are to be used immedi-
ately. If the debtor is not yet at retirement age, however, given the provisions of
most retirement arrangements, there is no assurance that this underlying as-
sumption will be fulfilled, and if it is not fulfilled the basis for the exemption is
nonexistent. To grant the exemption a bankruptcy court must be assured that
such exempted amounts will be available for the support purposes for which
they are exempt. In this situation, it is not a perversion of congressional intent
for the bankruptcy court to grant a Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E) ex-
emption on the condition that the debtor place the exempted or excluded assets
in a pension trust from which no loans or distributions can be taken or from
which no assets can be pledged, assigned or hypothecated in any manner by the
debtor prior to retirement. This approach also might qualify the pension ar-
rangement as a spendthrift-like trust excluded from the bankruptcy estate under
Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2).
This arrangement would be particularly helpful to the young debtor for
whom courts have been unwilling to preserve pension assets because they are
deemed unnecessary for a fresh start. 168 This reluctance appears to be based
upon the assumption that a young person will have sufficient time to reestablish
retirement savings and thus needs no current retirement plan assets protected
from creditors. The difficulty with this analysis is that there is no analytical
basis, other than instinct, on which the courts have drawn the line between those
too young to have such assets protected and those too old to permit assets to be
available to creditors. Given that the courts tend to view the preservation of
retirement assets as an all or nothing proposition, there is no room in currently
expressed theory to provide for age gradations. It is true that the pension assets
of one who is twenty-five years old will need less protection than will pension
assets of one who is thirty-five, and pension assets belonging to a thirty-five year-
old will need less protection than will those of one who is fifty. Nonetheless,
167. See generally Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt
Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RuTcERs L. REv. 615
(1978) (State exemption laws may allow retention of exempt property acquired on the eve of bank-
ruptcy if necessary for survival, financial rehabilitation, or familial support.).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 130-39.
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each has need for protection. This problem, as well as the problem of determin-
ing what is the "pension!' portion and what is the "savings" portion of a debtor's
pension benefits can be solved by application of actuarial theory.
The amount of retirement assets that needs protection from creditors in-
creases with the age of the debtor. The debtor always should be able to protect
an amount at least actuarially equal to what is necessary to provide a reasonable
retirement benefit. The 'protected amount should be that amount which, if left in
a tax free trust until retirement age, would produce a reasonable retirement ben-
efit. Alternatively, the protected amount should be the amount which, when
added to contributions that the court can assume will be made by or for the
debtor during the remainder of the debtor's working life, will produce the "rea-
sonable retirement benefit."
By way of example, assume that a reasonable retirement benefit is $750.00
per month in current dollars. There are two ways of assuring that this benefit
will be available to the debtor upon retirement. One way is to place a single
lump sum amount in a trust fund that, assuming actuarially determined trust
growth, will be sufficient at the debtor's retirement age to produce the then
equivalent of $750.00 per month in benefits. The other, probably preferable,
method of providing for sufficient assets upon retirement is to assume that the
debtor will be gainfully employed from the present to the time retirement age is
attained and that either the debtor or the debtor's employer will make contribu-
tions to a pension plan until the debtor's retirement. Because any assumed pen-
sion contributions are based on assumed earnings, the court will have to make
some assumption as to the debtor's anticipated future income. These estimates
can be made by extrapolating existing data on wage progressions in specific in-
dustries and professions. Once these estimates are made the court should permit
the debtor to protect from creditors that amount of his or her current pension
benefits which, when added to the assumed additional contributions and earn-
ings thereon, will result in an accumulation of retirement assets sufficient to pro-
vide a "reasonable retirement benefit."
Even if the adoption of the above method does not create results substan-
tially different from those attained on an ad hoc basis in existing cases, adopting
a theoretical framework for decision-making based on objective standards will
assure that treatment of all pension benefits is consistent, whether federal exclu-
sions or state or federal exemptions are used. This approach allows the courts to
carry out the intent of the bankruptcy laws without violating the policies of
ERISA. At the same time, the courts would free themselves from the theoreti-
cal box they are backing themselves into-an all or nothing approach to pension
benefit allocation under the bankruptcy law.
How much the "reasonable retirement amount" should be is difficult to say
and is a question of economics and social policy beyond the scope of this Article.
However, Congress has provided guidelines. Floor statements relating to the
passage of ERISA indicate that Congress intended pension benefits to act as a
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supplement to social security payments. 169 Social security payments provide
only the very basic retirement needs; clearly Congress felt that more support was
necessary.
170
There is a long distance between the bare, basic necessity felt insufficient by
Congress and the opulence that bankruptcy courts are unwilling to permit. The
courts should allow protection for a portion of pension assets that will produce
benefits at twice or three times the poverty line17 1 or the estimated poverty line
at the time the debtor will reach retirement age.
172
VII. CONCLUSION
The conflict between ERISA and the bankruptcy laws has not been ad-
dressed directly by legislation or adequately resolved by the judiciary. In gen-
eral, courts have favored the policy considerations of the bankruptcy laws over
those of ERISA rather than attempting to reconcile the apparently divergent
goals of these two legislative constructs. However, this preference is unneces-
sary because these two areas of law can be judicially or legislatively harmonized
to reflect the policies behind both without doing extensive harm to the basic
purposes of either.
169. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 146.
171. The term poverty line or poverty level "consists of a set of dollar thresholds which vary by
family size and composition. The average poverty threshold for a family of four persons was $9,862
in 1982L-]. . . the poverty thresholds are updated every year to reflect changes in the annual average
Consumer Price Index." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 144,
SERIES P-60, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW
THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1982, at 1 (March 1984). The poverty level in the year 1982 for a two person
household at or over age 65 was $5,831.
172. Assuming a poverty line that will be higher in future years as the result of inflation does not
suggest that the pension benefit which the court protects would be commensurately larger. Actua-
rial determinations of the assumed future contributions to be added to the current benefit would be
adjusted for the same inflation factor as is the poverty line. Consequently the amount of the current
protected benefit should not be enlarged inordinately.
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